in moments of silence & solitude i find the unity of my mind, instead of cohesing, often fragments from convergence, creating a synchronously present postulating-speaker & a distinctly separate analyzing audience other-self; the internal narrative becomes an empty solitary theatre populated simultaneously by a phantom performer & the apparitions of its reflecting audience. What is this, dialectical Schizophrenia?
-B1, "is this propensity symptomatic of brilliance, or of mad
ness?"
-B2 "Maybe both, probably neither?"
ness?"
-B2 "Maybe both, probably neither?"
B1. "in the absence of otherness the consciousness (an i/o alga-rhythm) becomes empty. "
consciousness, [1] when in a state of emptiness is stripped of its intentionality [2], and so becomes both empty and denied of the fundamental property according to which it is defined. Consciousness becomes unconscious, the mind becomes a non-mind."
. " ... and so, in a necessary act of self-perpetuating/self-sustaining self-preservation. the mind - when stripped in sensory, phenomenological or intellectual deprivation of the input of otherness that fuels the engine of intentionality - will tend towards fracturing anti-thetically in order to sustain the dialectal cognitive reaction cycle that sustains the computational life-support of the conscious mind."
B2. " Brilliant. Can we finish the lab now?"
[1] defined in terms of the intentionality of its-self as predicating on to an object-other, ie. Husserl: 'any consciousness is always necessarily a consciousness of some object x' ] ...
[2] for there can be no intentionality towards the absence of a preposition, and because a negative ontological state is not a coherent object- property
consciousness, [1] when in a state of emptiness is stripped of its intentionality [2], and so becomes both empty and denied of the fundamental property according to which it is defined. Consciousness becomes unconscious, the mind becomes a non-mind."
. " ... and so, in a necessary act of self-perpetuating/self-sus
B2. " Brilliant. Can we finish the lab now?"
[1] defined in terms of the intentionality of its-self as predicating on to an object-other, ie. Husserl: 'any consciousness is always necessarily a consciousness of some object x' ] ...
[2] for there can be no intentionality towards the absence of a preposition, and because a negative ontological state is not a coherent object- property
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